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I.

TN7I'RODUCTION

The fundamental aims of a nation's foreign policies arc
national security and the achievement of national objectives
through diplomacy.

At different periods in .American history, the

foreign policy of the United States has been designed to advance
a variety of aims. It is possible, for example, to speak of mis
sionary diplomacy, moral diplomacy, military diplomacy and dollar
diplomacy.

The latter characterizes one phase of economc fore�,gn

policy in which the administration of President William Howard
Taft represents a dramatic turning point.

The foreign aid prograos

of the period after World War II, such as the Marshall plan and the
Alliance for progress, have their roots in the economic foreign policy
of Taft and his Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox.
Taft described his convictions with regard to foreign policy
in these words:
The theory that the field of diplomacy does not include
in any degree commerce and the increase of trade relations
is one to which Mr. Knox and this adw�nistration does not
subscribe. We believe it to be of utmost importance that
while our foreign policy should not be turned a hair 1 s
breadth from the straight path of justice, it may be well
made to include active intervention to secure for our
merchandise and our capitalists opportunity for pro�itable
investment which shall insure to the benefit of both
countries concerned. There is nothing inconsis-cen-c in
the promotion of trade relations, and -cl-,e prot:ection whic�1
the United States shall assure to her citizens in ��e
assertion of just rights under investments :nade in for
eign countries, shall promote the amount of such trade,
it is a result to be commended.1
Henry Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard �a�"C:
A Biography (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1939), II, pp. 67S-9.
-1-

Secretary Knox admirably stated the meaning of dollar
diplomacy as follows:
It means using the capital of the co1.,1ntry in the foreign
field in a manner to enhance fixed national policies. It
means the substitution of dollars for bullets. It means
the creation of prosperity which will be preferred to pred
atory strife. It means ta.king advantage of the interest
in peace of those who benefit by the investment of capital.
It recognizes that financial soundness is a potent factor
in political stability; that prosperity means contentment
and contentment means repose.2
Thus, dollar diplomacy in the Taft administration had a
dual character; economic and political.

On the one hand, dollar

diplomacy meant the use of dollars to advance and protect .American
business abroad, and on the other hand it meant the use of dollars
to promote .American national security.3
Although

11

dollar diplomacy 11 is traditionally thought of with

respect to China, evidence of it's applica-cion ca,_� be found in the
relations of the United States with other countries as well.

P.n

example of the use of dollar diplomacy with national security as its
goal can be seen in the case of The Dominican Republic.

In 1904,

this Caribbean republic, unstable, deeply in debt, and on the verge
of bankruptcy and collapse, was threatened by European seizure of its
custom houses for the protection of European creditors.

At this

point, United States dollar diplomacy was implemented, to t;he bene
fit of both The Dominican Republic and the United S-'cates, by way
of an agreement in 1907 to have an .American :receiver-general col2Philander C. Knox, 11The Achievements of Dollar Diplomacy, 11
Saturday Evening Post, cr..x:;a:rv (March 9, 1912), pp. 4, 42.
3 Julius W. Pratt, A His-cory of Uni -r;ed States ?oreisn Policy
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1955), p. 420.
4
Knox

11

The Achievements of Dollar Diplomacy, 11 p. 42.

1.-.:cL :..t.11 cu::;tomc revenue;.;.

European c:rcditor::;

::,;J.W

thi.:,

;J.::;

a vir-

tu::i.l L,'Uaranty provided by the United States @d refrain from any
seizures.

During this same peTiod, dollar diplomacy was also

iI!lJllemented in other Latin .American countries, such as Nicaragua
and Honduras.
The A�erican policy with respect to Liberia, one of the
few independent African states of the time, may also be said to
have been influenced by dollar diplomacy.

In response to a

Liberian request for aid to rehabilitate her financial stability,
.American bankers, encouraged by the United States government,

5
interested themselves in Li�erian finances and lent assistancef.

Thus dollar diplomacy may be said to have been practiced on a world
wide scale.

5

Ibid., p. 3.

4

Tlie victory of the communist Chinese: forces over '.:-:ationalist
Chinese forces in 1950 resulted in a drarr.atic change in the United
States--China relations.

After the take-over by the Red regime,

Cnited Staccs foreign policy had to deal with a �cvernnent controlled
by forces that :1creto for, had been the object of rn.ilitary attack
by the Chinese �ationalists, with United States aid.

T�e Jnited

States 6.ose to deal with the cmnnunist government, essentially !:>y
122.t de.:iling with it, by refusing to recognize it as t:1e legitir.iate
governsent of China, and by blocking all efforts by some other na
tions to seat the representative of mainland China in the United
Nations.

Thus, a new era of United States--China relations was

inau;:;urated.

For a iialf century before, the ?Olicy of t�e United

States toward China was based upon the principles of (1) equality
of commercial op;:ortunity, and (2) mainter,ance of t;1e territorial
and administrative integrity and political incie2endence of China.
Although the United States at tiwes recoznized <lurins the
period from 1900 to 1950 the special relations between China and
other countries, it also recognized and asserted that the donination
of C�ina by any one power or any grou, of �ewers woulci be contrary
to the interests of both China and the United States.

T�e Cnited

States too� the position that the Chinese should he �iven ti□e to
develop those ?Olitical institutions w:aich would best meet their
nee·s in the Dodern world.

The Unitecl States also sougrit to prevent

t:,ird "i'owers fror:1 utilizing disturbances ·.dt:1.in China as an op?ortunity

5

for incivitlual or collective azr;randizer.ent. 6
Dur in::,, tlle first nal f of tile nineteent:1 ce1�tury, ,\mc:!r icar.
:rnlicy towaru Ct1iua was i..1plen,cnted by treaties anJ othc!r (1i.?lc.i1.1atic
procedures designed to secure equality of trading rights for the
United States and other nations.

One fundamental principle under-

lying American relations with China--equality of comr.,ercial opportunity--was incorporated in the first treaty between the two �ewers,
the Treaty of Wan�hia signed on July 3, 1844, in the form of a most
favored-nation clause. 7

Followins the O?ium �ar, Great Britain had

forced China to irant her additional commercial privileges.

The

Treaty of \fa6hia suaranteeci t:1at whatever treaty rig:1ts ot�1er powers
gained with respect to trade, residence, religious activities, tariffs,
or other cor.n:1ercial regulations, would autor,,atically accure to the
United States.

The most-favored-nation clause was retained in the

subsequent cor.ll'J.ercial treaties ne�otiated with China in ti1e nineteenth
century, namely the Treaty of Tientsin of 1858 and the Burlingame
Treaty of 1868.

The general articles of the Burlingame Treaty were

not of great importance.
vation.

There was, however, one significant inno-

The two nations agreed to recosnize the inherent and inalien-

able right of man to change his hor:1e and allegiance, and also the
mutual advantage of free migration and e@i�ration of their citizens
and subjects, respectively, fror:i. one country to t�--:.e ot:,er, for t:1e
pur�ose of curiosity, of trade, or as �erManent residence.8
6 u.s. Departnent of State, United States Relation with Ciiina
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 1.

7�., pp. 1-2.
8Foster 1{. Julles, China anc Amcric.:i: T;1e Story of their
Relation Since 1784 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946),
? • 74.

The principle of equality of co1,,r.1ercial op;iortuni ty worked
well until the late 1890's, when new imperialistic '.)ressures seen:ed
to U1reaten a division of Cilina amon� the otr1er [;reat powers, into
spheres of interest, or spheres of influence.
In the cultural influences which flowed from America to
Chin&, the role of missionaries was significant.

The first Ar,.1erican

missionaries to China, David Abeel and Elizah C. Gri�gecan, reached
Canton in 1800.

Their task was to convert the Chinese to Christianity.

I�i thin a few years, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign
�-lissions, the Presbyterians, the Baptists, and the Episcopalians ,,ad
sent additional men to this new foreign field.

After 1844, the growing

band of missionaries extended their activities to the new treaty ports.
Some eighty-eight American protestant r.1issionaries :rnd arrived in China
in 1860.

But the number of converts to Christianity among the great

masses of the people was ne6ligible and tne missionary enterprise
was often a great source of friction with Chinese officials because
of their traditional anti-Western concept.

�evertheless, the influ

ence of American missionaries helped materially to shape the course

of future Chinese events.9

The year 1898 saw a dramatic turning point in American Di?lo
matic ;1istory.

Tr1e victory of the Ar.1erican Asiatic squadron, commanded

by Commodore George Dewey, over the Spanish fleet in �fanila 3ay on
:-iay 1, 1898, see::1s to have started almost at once a :novement for permanent possession of the Philippine Islands by the United. States.

�emo-

rials :ro;:1 business grou?S and ci1ambers o±: cor..merce poured into the
State Departr.icnt emphasizing the value to tr1e Unitec: States of the
g_
, l
�-,
pp. 41- 4] •

Phili�10ines as the key to the ::-,arkcts of eastern ,\sia.

7

10

Phili�J�ines :iy t:12 Unite2 States, tiierc cz:n be no doubt thJ.t ti,e
desire for greater markets played a vital role in bringin;; a:Jout
the acquisition and retention of the islancls.

11

However, American

hopes of vast future markets in China see;-:-1ed dooned to be s:-iattered
by ti1e aggressions of European nations in the years fol lowin<"; the
Sino-Japanese i;Jar.

For in

1897, the :;reat J::uropean ?o·,.ers bec:,an

to clain r:10110:-,olics for economic exploitation wi t:1in certair, areas
°

in China called "s? neres of interest".
A "s1)nere of interest" was an area in China wr1erein a nation
had expressly or im:::iliedly declared tnat it would pernit no other
nation to exert political influence, and that only itself would

12

lead in the exploitation of the area's natural resources.

of the "sphere of interest" was exerted in the followinz way:

Control
first,

tne foreign investors secure0 a strate�ic base on tje seacoast; this
was followed by building a railway for exploitation of the natural
resources and the Jor:1ination of the economic life of the "sphere".

The

next st8p was to establish a bank which would obtain a first option
on loans or concessions, especially those covering tne railways and
mines.

To safe�uard its particular interests, the rovernnent behind

the investors then forced China to agree not to alienate its economic
control, and entered into ai:;ree;nents ·with other countries to respect
each ot;1er' s spneres of interest.
l

OAlfrcd �. Griswol6, Far Eastern Policy of the United States
C�evl i:aven:
Yale University Press, 1962), p. 15.

11 0enjamin h. \{illians, [conor:iic f'oreio.� Policy of' tl,e i:'nited
::it.:iteb (New Yori:
'.-kGraw-llill Co., 1929), ?• 321.
12

Jonn s. :�earing, Jollar Di,loi;1acy: A Story in .\J:·,erican
Jpl�rialism
L.W. husclish &. The Vikinp. Press, 1925),
__ (.,e,1 York:
p. 253.

The promise anct concessions obtaine� fros China wnicn threat

Q
(;

ened her co::n:1crcial freedom nay be enur:,erated as follm,;s: 13
:-iarcl1 15, 1897, a non-alienation pledge to i-' rance concernin>! i.iainara.
February 11, 1898, a non-alienation pledge to Great Britain concerning
the Yangtse Valley.
�farcn 6, 1898, a lease to Germany of Kiaochow Zay in Shantung for
ninety-nine years, together with railway and mining rights
in the province.
:-larch 27, 1898, a lease to Russia of the Kwangtung Peninsula for
twenty-five years, together with the right to construct a
railway from Harbin to Port Arthur. ·
April 26, 1898, a non-alienation pledge to Japan concerning Fukien
Province.
:,:ay 2 7, 1898, a lease to France of J:(wangchow '.fan for ninety-nine
years.
June 9, 1898, a lease to Great Britain of Kowloon for ninety-nine
years.
July 1, 1898, a lease to Great Britain of \.Jeihaiwei for "so long a
period as Port Arthur shall remain in occupation of Russia".
The Washington government soon recognized the danger triat
United States trade might suffer and initiated international action
to prevent the exclusion of its nationals from Chinese Xarkets.

With

a view to securing equal opportunities in the development of China's
trade, which was ::ielieved to offer vast fields for commercial and
financial enterprise, the United States sought to prevent the ?artition
of China, and particularly the absorption of �:anchuria by Russia, ar.d
also to prevent ti1e acquisition by any sin?.le power of exclusive interests and rights.
To that end, Secretary of State John Hay sent his famous
notes to the several powers.

The so-called ?Olicy of the O�e� Door.

for the first time officially ?renounced on t11at occasion, asked
for fon:ial assurances •14

Secretary of State riay asked only t:1at tr1e

?Owers o";)serve the princi?les of th0 O?en Door ·.,ith res;)ect to forei�:n
} .. Willia�s, Econo�ic Yorei?n Policv of trie United St2tes
13\u.u.
?P • 309-310.
11+

(;;ew York:

Theodore w. Ovcrlach, Foreirn Financial Control in C�iLa
;iacnillan Col, 1919), �. 199.

traue ·.;i t:1in t'.1eir s:,heres of interests; ;i.c clid not <)ropose that
ti1ey surrender ti10se spi1eres or a1�ree not to enlarn,e the�:,.
'.. iiilc tl1e diplo1;:at:; were still <lebatin "' the sir;nific.:mcc
of the notes and how they should reply to thcrn, the Chinese were
beginning to grow restless under foreign exploitation.
lessness culr.inated in the Boxer uprisin?, of 1900.

This rest-

That revolt

was cn:.shed oy the Great Po-,1ers, but its aftermath had ir:iportant
consequences on Ar.1erican ?Olicy in C1ina.

Secretary Hay took ad-

vantage of tne occasion to reaffirm the O?en Door doctrine in a
circular cormnunication sent to Great Britain, France, :lussia, Gerr:1any and Japan on July 3, 1900.

In it, i1e urged the powers coo?-

erate to bring aoout pernanent safety and peace to China, preserve
China territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights
;uaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and
safeguard for the world the principle of equal and ir:ipartial trade
·
lS
. . a 11 parts of the Ch.1nese ,..,.t:.np1re.
w1tt1

This doctrine was accepterl

on paper by the Great Powers.
The policy of the United States toward China was clearly
formulated by President Roosevelt in a speech delivered at San Francisco in 1903, in w�1ici1 ne proclaimed t:1at United States was a ;reat
Asiatic Power:
The extension of the area of our dor..ain has jeen ir.r:iense;
the extension in the area of our influence even sreater.
America's ;;eographical position in the Pacific is such as
to ensure neaceful dorr.ination if its waters in the ac:van
tage of that position.16
15

J ,,

. \',.

Pratt, A history of Unite� States ForeiPn Policv ?• 438 •

16J • ::i • �'\earing, Dollar Dinlonacy pp. 39-40 •

10

III.

s:'.AFT, KNOX A.TIJD DOLLA.."J'.{ DIPLOMACY

In the four years following the Roosevelt administration,
President William H. Taft and his Secretary of State, Philander C.
Knox gave a new turn to the Open Door policy inaugurated by John
Hay.

Hay had not concerned himself with the investment of .American

capital in China. For many years, free la.nd suitable for economic
expansion was abundant and easy to fin� in the United States and
opportunities for domestic capital investments were many. Con
sequently, before the turn of the century, there had been little
reason for American capital investing abroad.

But by the time of

the inauguration of Taft to the Presidency, such opportunities for
profitable investment at home were decreasing in number a..�d .American
investors were starting to cast their eyes towards other countries.
A period of the greatest expansion of foreign investment in .Amer
ican history was beginning.

Taft and Knox, in contrast to Hay,

became deeply interested in securing entry into China for Amer
ican capital, particularly in the field of railroad building.

The

evil effects of the 1907 panic had vanished by the time Taft took
office, and investment capital was available.

The Taft years were

thus years during which American capital was seeking foreign outlets,
• d usvria
.,_
1isl..,_,s so"c1gnl.,
• .,_ oraers
,
and wnen
.M..u1erican
in
.1.rom aoroaa. 17
,
A=
_c,

,

,

President Taft, himself, inaugurated a general policy of
economic imperialism known as

u

dollar diplomacy u .

Taft's adollar

diplomacy !! aimed to protect and encourage .American Investments in
p. 679.

17H.F. Pringle, The Life and Times of Will:'..am H. Taft, Vol. II,

L11c Fc.1.1· .l•:u.sL u.s well

r.J,:::;

1''1
:L n the Caribbc.:u.n.·-'

'['he ']\Lf:L u.d.min.i:�tt'aLillfi

made it clear as early as 1909, that it consiaercd China one:; 01'
most important fields for American diplomacy.

lJ.

L!'tl.:

One reason for the

new orientation was the President's background. Taft was familiar
with the Far East, for he had served almost three years in the
Philippines as governor, and, as Secretary of War, had on two occas-

.

19

sions conferred in Tokyo with Japanese leaders.

Un�uestionably, Secretary Knox was also responsible in :part
for the

11

dollar di:plomacy 11 of the Taft administration. President

Taft conceded that it was his Secretary of State who decided foreign
:policy in his administration and claimed only the merit of selecting
him for the task.20

At times the President became a bit nettled

at the overbearing assurance of his Secretary of State, but Taft
was easygoing and would merely remark,
fidence in Knox. 1121

11

there is no lack of con

The Secretary was determined to use American trade and in
vestment in foreign countries as a lever to help backward areas con
tribute to this goal.

Both Taft and Knox stressed

11

dollars not bul

lets II as the basic concept of their foreign :policy. Where the
United States had interests, or hoped to develop them, Taft and Knox
believed that the United States government had an obligation to help
18L.H. Battistinia, The United States of Asia (New York:
Frederick A. Praefer, 1955), :p. 71.

19walter Scholes, 11Philander C. Knox, 11 An Uncertain '.:.'radition:
Arnerican Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, ed. N.A. Graebner
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961), p. 67.
20Herbert F. Wright, 11 Philander C. Knox, 11 :i.n Arnerica.11
Secretaries of State, ed. S. F. Bemis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1929), IX, :p. 327.

21Archibald W. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, The Intima-ce Le-::;-::;ers
- 4.
of Archie Butt (New York: Doubleday & Doran & Co., Inc., 1930), p. L 2

nations in trouble, and that the best way to do so was �hrouGh the

12

stabilizing influence of loans. Money tended to have a q_uieting
effect by itself j in addition, the Secretary believed,

11

the borrower

is the servant of the lender, 11 so that any country under financial
obligation to the United States could not escape accepting some
measure of tutelage along with the loans.

The instruction and sup

ervision would, of course, benefit greatly not only the counGry
being instructed and supervised but also the rest of the world,
22
especially the United States.
Knox believed that the State Department s hould be active in
promoting opportunities for American business.

Willard Straigh�, a

State Dep artment official who served as a consul general at Mukden
in Manchuria, played a vital role in the dollar diplomacy of the
Taft administration.

Straight saw opportunities for development

of American trade in China and for railroad building. There was
only one way, he believed, in which he could effectively promote

.American Interests in Manchuria and at the same time use the increased .American influence for the benefit of Chinese independence.

He must bring about the investment of a large volume of American
23
._,_ 1 in
. �'hau_,_ region.
.
capiua

In November, 1907, Straight seized a fortunate opportur..i ty

for discussing his plan to expand American interesGs in Manchuria
with Mr. r;:1aft, then Secretary of War in Presiden� rtoosevelt: s
Cabinet, who happened to be �raveling in the Far East.
22Scholes,

Philander C. Knox, 11 .An Uncertain Tradition p. c-S2.

11

23Herbert Croly, Willard Straight (New York: the 1"1acmillan
Co., 1924), p. 237.

13
Taft was due in Vladivostok about the middle of November en route
for A'llerica by Trans-Siberian Railway.

Straight joined him there

on November 18, 1907, and took advantage of the opportunity to
submit to Mr. Taft arguments in favor of his general plan for the
investment of .American capital in China with the approval and sup-

2
port of the .American government. 4

Straight, in turn, was in close touc·.1 with the American rail
road king, Edward H. Harriman, who dreamed of extending his railroad
empire to Asia. Harriman' s direct business relations with the Far
East began in the year 1905.

Harriman was closely associated with

Kuhn, Loeb and Company, who had aided the Japanese government in
floating its war loans in the United States.

His interest in China

and Japan grew out of his connection with the Pacific Mail Steamship;
this is what had attracted his attention to that part of the world.
When, in the spring of 1905, Harriman received an urgent invitation
to visit Japan from the American Minister in Tokyo, Lloyd C. Griscom,
he determined to suspend, for a time, his financial and railroad
activities in the United States and personally investigate that
Oriental field, with a view to ascertaining what could be done to
extend .American commerce in the Far East.

25

During his stay in Tokyo, after reading maps and newspapers,
Harriman t·u.rned to Minister Griscom and said:
Griscom, there is no doubt about it. If I can sec·J.re control
of the South Manchuria Railroad from Japan, I' 11 buy the Chin24 Ib .d
i_., PP• 2 49-250.
__
25
George Kennan, E. H. Harriman: A Biograuhv (Boston: Houghton
Miffin Co., 1922), II, p. 1.

ese Eastern from Russia, acquire trac:kac;c over the Trans
Siberian to the Baltic, and establish a line oi' steamer:.; Lo
the United States. Then I can connect with the .A.merican
Transcontinental lines, and join up with the Pacific Mail
and the Japanese Transpacific steamers. It'll be the most
marvelous t ansportation system in the world. We' 11 girdle
the earth.2

14

6

Thus, the plan for a round-the-world transportation line
under unified American control was born.

To carry out this plan,

Harriman planned first to secure control of the South �'Ianchuria
Railway, which Japan had just acquired from Russia as the result
of the Portsmouth settlement.
Japan's determination to eX})loit these Manchurian properties
itself postponed the execution of Harrirnan's plan, but their project

was later revived by Straight.27

For a year or more, after Harriman's Tokyo visit, no op
portunity to promote the Far Eastern enterprise presented itself.
But in September, 1907, Lord Ffrench, representing Pauling
& Co., of London, and J.O.P. Bland, representing the "British and
Chinese Corporation, 11 secured from the Chinese government the right
to extend the Chinese Imperial Railway from Hsin-min-tun to Fakumen,
with the privilege of building, ultimately, to the trans-Siberian at
Tsitsihar. As this seemed to open the way for such a Russian connection as Harriman had in view, Straight wrote him, in September,
1907 suggesting an alliance with the British syndicate, as a means
of securing the essential link in the projected round-the-world line
without the cooperation of the Japanese. Harriman replied by caole,
26charles Venier, The United States and China 1906-13: A stud of Finance and Di�lomacy (New Jersey: Rutzers University Press, 1955, �- 2?.
27Ib l.d •, p. 28.
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The Manchurian Scene of Action
(From a map drawn by Frederick D. Cloud, June 20, 1909)
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however, in October 1907, that owing to the panic of that year, fin-

16

ancial conditions were such as to prevent the raisins of the neces28
sary funds.

Harriman's death on September 10, 1909 brought to an end this
particular scheme of a rolUld-the-world American transportation line.
Straight may have been saddened by Harriman's death, but there was
one important compensation: William H. Taft assumed the Presidency
of the United States in 1909.

The new President soon demonstrated

his concurrence with demands of trade, investment, salesmanship, and
efficient orga..Dization when he went before the Congress to state his
conception of American foreign relations.
There was, he said, a basic relationship between political
and economic interests which the government had to recognize. Repres
entatives of Arnerican finance and industry sought investment oppor
tunities and markets. Wherever they went, Taft claimed, the government
had to follow, providing protection and seeking additional openings
for its nationals.

For the achievement of this purpose, he asserted

it was necessary to enlarge and reorganize the State Departmern:; in
the interest of greater efficiency, and called for Congressional
29
appropriations to carry out this program.

28George Kennan, E. H. Harriman p. 25.

p. 88.

29charles Venier, The United Sta-ces and China, 1906-1913
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IV.
Philander

c.

RAILh'AY LOA.\iS

Knox entered upon his duties as Secretary of

State on :-farch 6, 1909.

Ile soon becau1e keenly interested in Assist

ant Secretary of State, Huntington Wilson's plan for the reorsaniza
tion of the State Department.

The most important innovation in this

reorganization was the establishrr.ent of three new politico-3eo:;ra?hical divisions--a �estern European, a Near Eastern an� a Latin
Am.erican--in addition to a Far Eastern Division.30
The reorganization of the department was very efficient, the
acme of administrative decentralization.

Taft defered to Knox, who

gave a wide grant of auti:10rity to iiuntinr;ton Wilson.

i{ilson in turn,

was Straight's superior while he was Acting Chief of the Division of
Far Eastern Affairs.

All important offices, from Taft down to Strai�ht,

were held by men who favored. a more active role for the United States
in Cl1ina and ?-ianchuria. 31
Eoth Taft and Knox were synpathetic to American economic ex
?ansion, and Straight, who had returned to Hashington, \Jas able to
persuade the Department of State that the Orient offered great possibilities.

Secretary l�nox was not hard to convince and he issued a

.
32
.
ctepartnent raemorandu� dec 1aring:

Tne nations that finance the 8reat Chinese railways anci
other enterprises will be foremost in the affairs of China
30c ranam
.
•
li. S tuart, T'
· rie Denartment
o f <:utate: ,\ .historv
or- I ts
.
0rQanization 1 Procedures, and Personnel (New York: 7hc �acrnillan Col,
1949), p. 215.
31charles Venier, The United States and China, 1906-1913 p. 92.
32stuart, The Denart�ent of State �- 221.

anci t'.1e �articip:::tion of Ar1er:i.c:m c2. ryital in tiwse invest
racnts ,-1ill give the voice of the United States :'lore autl1or
ity in political controversies in t'.1at country which will
go for tm10.rd f,uarantee:ing the preservaticn of the adr::inis
trativc entity of China.
The Taft administration was now positively interested in
pror:i.oting At!lerican influence in China by means of American invest
ment.

It proposed and began to support this policy witt1 all the

diplomatic resources of the State !Jepartment�

The State Departr:i.ent' s

full support of le�itimate and beneficial Av.erican e�ter?risers in
foreign countries was now ;,rovided to the prudent investor deisrins
to know in advance what would be done for him if, throuc;h no fault of
his own, he got into trouble, due, say, to oppression or failure to
protect on the part of some foreign government.33

The loan policy with China involved foreign investments of
such great unquestionable potential national advantage that the government was an active participant in them.

After urging investors

to ?er�it theMselves to become instrumentalities of the United States
foreign policy, the government clothed those investors with rights to
protection of especial di�nity. 34
In the spring of 1909, Knox faced a situation which to him
had serious implications for the economic and political position of
the United States in China.

Backed by their respective governnents,

a trii)artite 3rou:, consistin!_? of French, English anc German bankers
ne6oti.:1ted an a�reer.1ent to lend money for the construction of two
important railroad systems, one from Hankow to Szechuan and ti1e
other fro:'!: H.:mkow to Canton.

These railroad lines were callee

33t:untinston in lson, "The �elation of Governnent to Foreign
Investr,:ent," The Annals I Ar.1erican Acader.1y of Political and Social
Science, LCVIII (;�ovember 1961), ?• 299.
3 4l2.i£.., ??• 303, 310.
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collectively t;ie l1ukuanp.; :"\ailways.

;\r:icrican non-particiµation in

'1�()

·,s1t1at was known as the lmkuang Loan meant less of investr.,ent outlets
and also of narkets, for United States firms would not be entitled
to SU??lY any of the materials. 35

It was at once noticed that the Hukuang Loan agreement containeL two provisions of real interest to A.'Uerica.

First, the internal

revenue (lii<in) were to be pledged to the lenders, and second, all
railway materials purchased abroad were to be bought in the countries
whose nationals supplied the loan. 36
Following the announcement of the agreement i::>etween the
Ci1inese government and the governments of Germany, England, and France
for ti1e Hukuang Railways in Nay 1909, the Awerican government sent a
protest to Peking on '.fay 24, 1909.

The Department of State recalled

tnat the Chinese government had in 1904, pror:iised to give An1erican
capital a chance to participate in the financing of at least one of
these proposed Hukuang Railways.

The American claim was based on

the written assurance given by China to Minister E. H. Conger in 1904
that, if China were unable to raise money for construction of a rail
road from Hank ow to Szechuan, it would give .\merican and English cap
italists ti1e first chance to finance tl1e line.

The Department of

State, acting in this instance from political motives and on its own
initiative rather than the prompting of private interest, new callee
tte attention of the Chinese �overnment to the interests of its

? • 68.

35\falter Scholes, "Philander

c.

Knox," An Uncertain Tradition

3611our :Jollar Jiplor,1acy and Secretary Knox " llarner' s \-Jceklv
,
.'fa;',azine, LIV (April 23, 1910), p. 8.
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ex;i l a1ncc,
1.,,
t"ese
worc.s:
In order, therefore, that the Gnitcrl States mi�ht be en
titled to a practical, and not cerely to a t:1eoretical,
choice in this rr.atter as well as to assure to Anerican
manufacturers a share in the profits of Chinese railway
construction and the business arising therefro�, it was
essential t:1at representative Anericar. ca?i talists should
::1articip2tc in the Hukuan,: Loan.
Havinz. determined that the markets of Ci1ina should not oe
closed to ,\r:,erican econor.:ic interests, the Jcpartncnt of State pro\)OSeci to a srou;,i of American financiers t;1e clesirability of certain
investments in Cl1ina as a watter of ,\nerican national policy.

An

Ar.1erican r,roup, consistins of J. P. :1organ & Co., Kurm, Loeb & Co.,
the ?i rst ;fational Dank of :{e:v York, and the National City Bank of
�ew York, was formed in the sprinR of

1909 upon the expressed desire

of the Depart.nent of State that a financial group be organized to
take U? the �articipation to which American capital was entitled in
the llukuang Loan a3reement then under negotiation '.J'] the British,
French, and German banking groups.
Tl1e Al;1erican group thus becar..e interested in Chinese loan
catters, not �ni1:1arily for its-Hukuang-profit, but for the ?urposes
indicated by Taft and Knox.
to Congress of .Jecember,

As statec in President Taft•s message

1909, these purposes, in effect, calle<l

for t,1c coo?eration of tlle :.iankers as the "indispensable instru;;-ientality" w·,1ic:1 tne Anerican governrr:ent need'"C: to eaable it to "carry
37

11er0ert Croley, Willard Strai'!ht, ??•

p. 211.

282-290.

38T�eo<lore ::. Jverlach, Forei�n Financial Control in China,

21
out a ;Hactical anc; re.:.11 .:li)plication of t:1c U:,1_,r, Joor i'olicy."

T'.1c

Je·;,artr.ient of !:)tate considered tnat Ar:eric.an coo�er;1tion ,1itt1 the
,iankin<� 6roups of tne s2veral r.;reat Powers ena::ilE:d ti,e united State3
to exercise a Jractical voice in China's affairs and constituted the
nest guarantee for tile preservation of China's integrity.39
Throughout June and early July, 1909, Hasi1ington continued
to oer.:anc. Anerican inclusion in the Hukuan;j Loans.

The Chinese \vcre

?laceC.: in the fauiiiar position of oeins in the center of international
rivalries.

i.{emmerl in by American desires on the one side and by tri-

?artite resistance on the otl1er, the C1inese c;overnraent agreed to
Anerican participation if the other ?Owers consented.

The Anglo-French-

Gerr:wn financiers ,.;ere reluctant to admit a fourth ;>arty to this im?Ortant business; hut as matters had reached a deadlock, they offered
a twenty-five per-cent interest in the Szechuan :Zailway to the .tlJ.--:iericans, but wis:1ed to exclude them fror.1 any share in t11e Canton concession.

'i'i.1e Auericans clair,,ed they were entitled to a fifty per-cent

interest in t:1e Szechuan line, on the basis of the '!_nomise to Conger.
However, they were willinc to settle for a twenty-five per-cent
40
;rnrticipation in ootn concessions.
drag on indefinitely.

T;1e question seemed likely to

The diplomatic efforts seemed futile and the

C::1inese government allowed r.1atters to drift, :10pinf, that the foreigners
-..;ould q_uarrcl amongst themselves.
At this point President Taft ste?ped in.

Breaking all dip-

lonatic precedent, he sent a ?ersonal message to Prince Chun, re�ent

39 11 'L1e i'assinr; of ucllar :Jiplorr:acy, 11 A...-:erican Journal of :i:nter
natio:-ial La:-1, VLL U.:ewYork:
Baker, Voarhis & Co., 1913), ?• 340.
40i-,cr�iert Croley, l:illard Strni.<,l•t, ;,. 294.
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. i, 1
in d�ich he statcc:
I .:1,.1 cistur:.;cc., iJ.t t;1e re;-,ort th.:,t t.wre is ccrt.1in 11rcj
t1Gice:� 0,1:)csiticn to :rnur n;overn::1er..t 1 s ar,t:.n�in-; for ec;u2}
n2rtici:,at:.on -.:,y :'u::erican ca:::ital in c::c ?resent r:-!.i.l·.iay
lccJn, •• I senci t;--lis r.tessacc r,ot doubtin� that your reflection
upon t:1e !.>road phases of this subject ·..;ill at once have
results satisfactory to both countries,,,I have resorted
to this soaewhat unusually direct cor:m:unication with your
Irr.perial highness, because of the high importance tl1a1: I
attach to the successful result of our present ne�otiations.
ConfrontcC:: by suc;1 deterr:iination, China anc the four ".'>oucrs
na�c a virtue of necessity,

A prcli�inary a�recment for the Hukua�g

Loan was dn,wn u;, :Jy the Ceman, Eri tis:1, ?-::-ench, e.nc: ,\r.-,erican 1),-:mlzers

. on ,·,ay
"at n
l ar1.s

42
J_
23, '910
,

si::;:1.eci or: :1.�y 20,
tot.J.l

1911.

43

,\nd the final ar,rcer:ient for t:-:.e loar. ,;.:is
It -:ncvided for an e�ual sr1arin;:; of the

$30,000,000 anount 3.D'lons the four lcn0C;rs,
In tnis agree:r;1ent trie Imperial goven,r::ent of C,ina aut�1orize<l

::he !.>ani:�ers of ti1e four :)owe rs to issue
six million pounds sterlin�.
years.

c1

five ?er-cent gold loan for

The tern of the loan was to ;)e forty

The security was to be the likin, salt, and rice taxes.

liritish,

German and Ar:1erican engineers were to work on the sections in which
their res�ective groups were interested.
During the years

The loan was made that year,44

1907, 1908, and 1909 a ?reject for t:1e con-

struction of a lon:::; Chinese �overnment railway between Chinchow and
Ai0;un was bein; advanceCJ by joint A.'i1erican and British financial and
;;rcl!::_1s.

45

A ::irelirninary agreceent concernin;::; th-:! C:1inc;10,,·-

41united States Forei�n Relations, 1909, p. 178,
42u:1itec� States foreir ::n :�elations,

43 ,1ar es en1.er,
c·
1
V .

u. s.

and C�ina

1910, p, 2S0.
1906-1913, ?P• 180-193.

.
44J . S • 1."car1.ng,
Jollar ilinlonacy, ?• 45.
45carl ',,;. Young, '.I.'he International ?-elations of :ranchuria
(Cnicac:;o:
l.ii.1iversity of C:1ica;::o Press, 1929), ;). 113,

Ai '"';Un �:ai h1ay w.-is sir.nee ;:t '.lukc:en on Octohccr 2, 1909 :)'J tr1c v:i ccroy
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o: : ;ancirnri.::. anc t11c governccnt of rcn�ticn o;, 011<: side, ;mu t.ie ,\:';(•rican rroup anc! Paulin� anc.; Con;pany for the ....iritis�. •>,roup, on tilC 0t:,cr
for ti1e financin3, construction, and operation of the railway fron
C.n1ncnow
.
,
• .
46
to �1gun.
The agreement was entered into by Willard Straight for the
.\r,erica.1, ;:;rou? a:1.C: i..ord Ffrench fer Pauling and Cor.,pany, and •,1as sub
ject to ratification by tneir principals.

Tl1e A�reement prcvicied tnat, 47

1. Since it ciz1t be necessary for the group, in making its
financial .:1rrangenents witi1 b1e C,1inese gcvernraent, to furnish
funds on terms ensuring a raar[;in of i)rofit less that justified

oy

the risks involved, Pauling and Cor.1':)any, would 0ive the

American 6roup no less than the 2 1/2 per-cent of the contract ;nice for both sections of the railway referred to,
such percentage to be paid on the con?letion of the entire
road.
2. At least one-half of the materials anci equi:::ment purci,ased
was to oe ,\."nerican.
3. Certain American engineers, to oe recor.in;cnd.ed by t:1e Anerican sroup, were to be employed

oy

Pauling and Cor,:pany during

tje period of construction.
Ti1is ae;reer.ient was rcquircc.i to have t: e s.:mction of a Cninese
iL;-,eria.1 eC:.ict ·..:.efore oeconing effective.

Ti1e prelicinary a·:;rce:--.:ent

I "
�. .
.
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;,eutralizatio:1 Sci-1.en;c."

''.'ii:i.S

'f:K :-:nox

. 49
notes stateo:
The government of the United States asks tiis Brit.'.l.nnic '.1aj
esty' s governraent to give their consideration to tl1e following
alternative and more comprehensive projects:
First, ?erharis
t:ie most effective way to ?reserve t:1e undisturbec'. enjoyr-:ent
· nchuria and to :nonote
".Jy Cilina of all political rights in :;a
tiie cievelo?ment of those Provinces unJer a ?ractical a:)?lica
tion of the policy of the open door and equal commercial
opportunity would be to bring the >lanc::-iurian ni�hways, the
railroads, (sic.) uncer an econo;"i\ic, scientific, anc i!l1par
tial adr:.inistration by some plnn vesting in China the owner
ship of t:'1e railroads throur-h funds furnished that purpose
Second,
by the interested powers willing to participate.
should this suggestion not be found feasible in its entirety,
t11en the desired end woulc be approxinated, if not attaineci.,
by Creat Jritain and the United States cli:;ilomatically sup
porting t:i1e Chincl10w-Aigun arran3enent and inviting tr,e in
terested ?Owers friendly to complete commercial neutralization
of :fanchuria to participate in tne financing and construction
of that line.
In reply tc Knox's proposal, British foreign minister Edward
Grey responded on �fovember

25, 1909:

50

The general principles involved in the first of your excel
lency's two suf:gestions entirely commend:; itself to His :faj
esty's Government, so far as the preservation of the o,en
door polic;• and equal commercial opportunity are concerned,
and would in their opinion, be well adapted to securing to
China full control in ;-1ancnuria.
I an, however, of the O?in
ion, that until tl1e ?enciin?, negotiations for the 1-iukuang loan
have oeen corapleted, it would seer.1 undesirable to consider
the c;_uestion of another interu.:itional loan for C:-1ina's rai 1wa.y undertakings, and I woulc'. sug3est. t:1erefore, that, for
the ?resent at any rate, it would je wiser to post,one con
sideration of the first schenc • .-\s re�ards the alternative
?roposal, I observe with satisfaction that the coo?cration
of interested ;,owe rs forms �rnrt of t:1e sc:-,e;-:;e, ar.c I �,z.ve
t�c honor to su�sest that as a ?relirninary ste? to�ard at
t.1ininz this c:esirab le end the two Sovernments sl10uld u:1.i te
in enccc:vorinz to :,ersuade the C:1inese Coven:r:,e:c.t to .::.c:-.-.it
the Japanese to participation in the C}1inc:1ow-Aiv,un line,
2s ;;e.in.:; t:·,e ?�<rties �1ost interested.
I ••

'+:I Jni t:el'. St2tes ?orei�n �elatiocs, 1910, ??•

T"'. 235-236.

234-235.
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.. e::t t:o f2cc ot;ier ·,,o:1crs ·.-1;.. t:10ut any f.:vora.;lc co;Td tr..�nt fro::: r::re:c:.t
.,rit2.in.

'ft1c Jritis'.1 :::overar;,ent. in fact. toe:: a,t enc::.rcly sys...,at:.ctic

attitude toward tl,e views of both .Ja-;,an ancl ,h.:ssia.

It was bound to

tr.e forrr,er by the A,"1glo-Japanese Allio.nce.51 an(! its action was c-;overned in res;_')ect to the latter

by the .\nglo-R.ussian agreement of 1899.

Ti1e 2ri tis;1 contract for the line fro::1 llsinr.'.intu::: to Fakul:len :,ui.s si,:-,;ned
in

1907 anC.: it was for a railway '.vhici-1 wo.s specifically rnentione� as

a �ritis� ?roject in a supplecentary letter to the exchange of notes
between Great Britain ancl :'ussia in 1399 • concerning spheres for rai 15?
.
way concession. Sjortly �fter the British indicated they were not willing to
acce?t Knox's neutralization ?lan, disapproval •.rns in(:icated also oy
beth �;,ussia and Jo.rian on the sa-;;ie date, January 21, 1910.

The Russian

aide-r.,emoirc contended that nothinz apne.:ired at tne tir:ce to L,re2,ter..
ei tner the soverci;::;nty or the Open Door -:,olicy in :!anchuria.

At t:1c

sar:ie tine the Itussian �overnr.1ent declared that the estaolishment of an
international ac.ininistration and control of the United States would
seriously injure Russian interests, both puolic and private, to �v:1ich
t:-ie l�ussian government attached ca:-iital ir.qortance.

Concerning the

second alterr,ative of t:1e Anerican pro?ositicn cf t:-ie Chinc:10:1-Ai[;u:1
railway project• the Russian �overnment also C:eclarcJ t:1at it regarded
t�e project of t�e pro?osed railway construction as beinr of ca?ital
i�?ortance to �ussia.
51Paul ::. Clyde, International :uvalries in ·:ancr·uria 163)1922 (Colu�bus: Ohio State University Press, 1926), ,. 137.
52

c�.arles �. ��eiaer, i"orein;n lnvestr.ent in Cr1ina (:,ew Yod,:
The .rae,,illan Co., 1933), p. 266.

T.1e; reasor, t:1e �,u::;sian governr..ent •,;as so nn.,c:: concerncu wit:.
t.:c C-1inc.10v1-.\.i,::;un )rOj ect was that its accor:'">lis .. ::,(.cnt ,1ould ope:: �""
a ae� route �ivins access from the sout� not only to the Chinese :astern .Zailroad, but ciirectly to Russian possessions at Aigun.

This shows

the strategic and political importance of the enterprise.53
Ti1e reply of the Japanese government to the 1'.nox plan was also in the nc0ntivE:.

In the note, the Jap2nesc foreign minister, Count

Kor.cura, declared that the most serious objection to the proposal in
question lay in the fact that it contemplated.

a very inportant depar-

ture fror., the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, because that treaty
was designed to establish in :1anchuria a perraanent order of things
whici1 trw i:�nox pL.m would upset.

54

So far as the question of t:1e

O?en Door was concernec2, the Japanese 6overnr;ient declared. taat tne
principle of ec:ual opportunity possessed in its ap�1lication to :;anc.1Uria
a more cor.ipre":-lensive signification that it had elsewhere in China, since

by

virtue of Article

VII

of the Treaty of ?ortso.outh the Japanese and

Russian railways in the Provinces of ::anchuria were cedicated exclu
sively to cor:imercial and industrial uses.

In the interest of econor.1y

and efficiency of cne manager.1ent, the substitution of international
for national concrol of railways in �-lanchuria would be cisadvant.'.lgeous
,::md undesirable, saic. t:1e Japanese note.

It further asserted that in

t'.1e rc;:-;i.ons affected by the Ja::,anese railways in '.'..:mcirnri.::: t;1ere :1a<.:
:_;rown u:,1 nur.�erous .Ja?ancsc industrial and co:-.:r,ercial unC:ert.s.izir,r:s,
2.r.C: :.n r:1c. Levclo·,,r-.ent of t:1ese enter-prises, a lar?,e numt>er of Ja-:,anese
Su.J�ects anc'. larf,e surr,s of Ja:,ancse money m�re enlisted; therefore, the
53criitcc'. '.3U.tes -Porei"n ?.elations, l'JlO, ??• 2L,9-250.
54 . , .
Ln., • , _, • 2 51.
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Ja?e.,�E:se -::;overr:.�.,ent coulC:. not consent to :;urrene:.er t:10 '.'.,cans '.Jy
,J'.1ic·.1 :;uc1 ?rot.::ction :me defense were r...:it:e: ;,cssi: :Jlc.
'I'i1us, Knox's "::eutralization Sc!ier:w"
do-..;rn 07 tne powers involved.

\j.'.J.S

:,ractically turncl:

Instead of bringin;:; about a close co-

operation among the ?Owers in :fanchuria, Knox's diplomacy forced
r<.ussia

and Japan into an entente through fear of American penetration

into :-:�anc:rnria.

On July 4, 191J Russia .:me Japan signed an agreec,ent

. ).·1ancaur1.a.
,
. 55
to res?ect each ot:1er , s s;,>heres of interest 1.n
Althouei1 the Knox sci1eme appeared to be aimed at ultir:i.ate
control by China of her own economic and ?Olitical affairs, t'.w Sec
retary a;,parently ignored the reality of international politics in
the Far East as well as Europe.

On July 30, 1907, Japan and Russia

signed a secret treaty 56 in ·,,hich Ja.pan recognized that Russia nad
special interests in northern ::ancheria and Outer :-1on;:;olia and Russia,
in return, recognized southern ilanchuria and Inner �1ongolia as an
area w�1ere Ja-::>an had the special interests.

Both countries under-

took positive ob li3ations to support and defend wnat had been es tao
lishe<l.

57
Knox also ignored the facts of the Anglo-Ja!)anese Alliance

system.

i::nsLmd needed the friendship of .Jo.pan and :Zussia because

of her �rm-1in8 rivalry with Germany, and could not antagonize ther:
:iy SU?:?Ortinc; the Knox sche:ne in :-'.anchuria.
The irr.1:Jasse to ,-1'.1ich the refusal of :Zussia .s.nd Ja:,;:i_n :,rour,i1t
t;1e ;\,:1erican [>;Overnment in 1910 resulted ir. an exc:1ansc of o:,inion
55

Ernest E. Price, The Russo-Jaryanese Treaties c c 1907-1916
Concerninc-; ::2nchuria and ::on'.!olia (Baltir;;ore:
Tl:e John ilopkins Press,
1933), ?• 54.
56 ...
1
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;-,olicy 1.n C,una.
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22, 1910 ;:;ivin'', '.1is o:,inio:1 of the Knox

He believed that the vital interest of ti1c Ja:-:,anese

was in :fanchuria and Korea and therefore it would be in the An1erican interest not to take any steps as rc;3ards :'ianchuria wi1ich would give the
Ja,ianese cause to feel t:rnt ,\r.;e:ric.s. \•:ere :-.ostile to ther.1 and their
interests.

RoosLvel t did not believe in the UniteC: States ta:dng any

;:iosition any•,;nere unless 1\r:'.ericans coulC: make gooc.

Re3arc,in3 '.far.-

ct1uria, if t:.:e Jal)anese chose to follow a course of conduct to which
A:1ericans were adverse, the Ar:iericans coulc: not sto:, it unless they
were ?re?arcd to �o to war, he stated.

Accordin: to Roosevelt's asser-

ticn, the Open Joor ?Olicy in China was an excellent tiins, so far as
it cou!� �e Llaintained by general diplo�atic a3r2e�ent.

rlowever, he

concluded ti1at tt1e Jpen Door ?Olicy co;;-.;,letely disa??earcd a:, soor. as
a powerful nation c.:etermined to ciisregard it, and was willins to run
the ris�, of war rather than observe it.

;toosevelt considered the use

of force out of the question if it were to becone necessary as an alternative to c.li�lor.:iatic cooperation.
O?en Door was not tried

by

Ti1e use of force to maintain the

the Taft administration.

In his re:,ly to Roosevelt's ar3urnent, Secretary Knox clearly
ir,dicateC: tnat ,;.:i1et;1er the American l'eo?le ,.rem] <l ever go to w2-r or
not i:1 tr1e c.iefence of ,\merican i.nterests in China de:,encec.: on the
n2.ture; of t.,e provocation,

iiatiever, Knox was not ?repare<l to ans·.1er

tjc question rcsarc.:ing wiether the Gnited States would be willin� to
�ive military SU??Ort to the Open Joor Policy.59

Yor:(:

581:rle:r ::Jennett, ;-�oosevelt and the AUSS0-._;2n;;mcs2 '-:ar c�e:.;
Joujlec.ay, Pc.ge & Co., 1925), p. 320.

591 ...
�•' :1P• 36-37.

Vichrcc.. fro:-� anor::1er .J.nrlc, the difference :Jct�1cen Roosevelt
;:.ncl ;:-.:.nox ,Ias that

'.ooscvelt in 1910 was o'.;servin[ the ".:1r l.:astern

,roblec, fro,: tl,c view:;;oint of 1905.

iie die: not k:10w t'.1at in the

secret treaties with kussia of 1907 anJ 1910, Japan had virtually repudiated ;1er ?rof:lise to him to µreserve the Open Door ancl the integrity
of China as related to :1ancnuria.

He did not realize how greatly

tlle balance of ;:,o·,.,er for wnicL ·:1.e i1ad striv2n in 1905 was sl1iftin�.
':'i1C nc::utralization pl:m was put forward to accomplish t:1e exact pur?OSe wnic:1 Joosevelt hac adopted ir. 1905, n,3.r:-,ely, t:1e preservation of
Chinese soverei3nty in �anchuria.

The essential difference bet�een

the Roosevelt and the Knox policies was in r,,.ethod.

The forf:ler sou5;ht

to preserve China by cooperative, the latter by independent and isolated
actioa.60

60�- . ·

�-. �?• 324-325.
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V.

CURRENCY RED'ORM AND REORG.M'TZJ.'\.TION LOAllfS

The scheme for currency reform as pa.rt of a larger progrrun
of general reform in China had a history that began with the Sino
.American Commercial Treaty of October 8, 1903, in which article XII I
provided as follows:

61

China agrees to take the necessary steps to provide for a
uniform national coinage which shall be legal tender in
payment of all duties, taxes and other obligations through
out the Empire by the citizens of the United States as
well as Chinese subjects.
On August 11, 1908, Tang Shao-Yi, Chinese special ambassador
to the United States, proposed to the Secretary of State the float62
ation of a loan for public works in Manchuria.
With the approval
of Secretary of State Elihu Root and President Roosevelt and the
cooperation of Straight, conversations began with Kuhn, Loeb and Co.
On November 8, 1908, while Tang's proposal was under consideration
by the United States, the Viceroy of lf.1a.nchuria consluded a loan
with the HongKong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and its French
and German colleagQes for $1,100,000.
Currency reform was desperately needed particularly in
view of China's financial straits, its ambitions to promote econ
omic development, and the need of the empire to increase its indebt-

63
edness to foreign capitalists in order to finance such develo�men0.
The division of Far Eastern l1.ffairs in the State Department regarded
61

u.S. Foreign Relations 1912, p. 88.
62
Ibid., p. 88.
63
Charles Venier, The U.S. & China, 1906-1913, p. 176.

currency reform as

11

pressing. 11
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In December, 1908, Tang Shao-Yi

proposed to the Secretary of State that China, through American cap:'..talists, float a·' large loan for meetins the eX})enses incicient to
currency reform and the abolition of likin� The proposal was laid
before Kuhn, Loeb and Company, who accepted it. The Chinese
government did not, however, find itself ready immediately to
65
begin
. negot·ia�ions.
. .
The internal condition of China in 1909 was unstable.

The

Manchu Dynasty (1644-1911) was near its end. At the beginning of
1909, Yuan Shik-K 1 ai, was thereby forced to return to China.
Af'ter the Chinese government issued an edict on May 24, 1910
establishing a uniform monetary standard on the -basis of the J.vlexican
silver dollar, the a-::ting Secretary of State, Huntington Wilson, ex
pressed to the Chinese minister in Washington on June 13, 1910 his
belief that the introduction of a satisfactory currency system would
place China in a very advantageous position in respect to the pro-

67

posal to increase import duties.

On September 22, 1910, the Vice President of the C�inese
Board of Communications, Sheng Kung-pao, asked the American rr�nister
to China, William J. CaThoun, whether .American bankers would be willing
to undertake a loan of about fifty million taels in order to elaborate
64
U.S.
lations of the
Office, 1915),
65
U.S.

66

Dept. of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign ReUnited States (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
pp. 249-250.
Foreign Relations 1912, p. 88.

Wolfram Eberhard, A History of China (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1950), p. 323.

67u.s. Foreign Rela�ions 1912, p. 89.
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the currency reforr.1. A week later, September 29 ) Secretary Knox
sent a telee;rao to Calhoun instructing him to inform the Chinese
government -chat the Morgan syndicate would un.dertake the loan and
that the State Department hoped the arrangements could be made soon.

68

Upon the recipt of this note, the Chinese government made a suggestion
that if the United States would undertake the loan of $50,000,000,
an American would be appointed as a financial adviser to assist in
currency reform. The Chinese government desired to negotiate -che
loan with the American bankers only.

This new proposal was accepted

by the Ar.1erican group, and of this $50,000,000 loan, $20,000,000
taels (about $20,000,000) were included for Manchurian development.

69

Before the preliminary agreement for the loan was signed, the
.American bankers, through the Department of State, informed the Chinese
government that if its representatives were authorized to sign, there
would have to be a full understanding that the group must have an
absolutely free hand in marketing the bonds and in associating with
it such European interests in the final agreement as it desired.

To

this, the Chinese government replied that the bankers might have as
many with the .Americans only and would expect them to hold the majority
0
of the bonds.7 On October 27, 1910, the preliminary agreement for a
loan of $50,000,000 to finance currency reform a�d the industrial
development of Ma..�churia was signed in Peking by the American fin
ancial group and -che competent Chinese

authorities.

The principal

68D:nd., p. 90.
69�
101.d • , pp. 90-91 (One Tael is about one dollar)

�-,
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lkl...!"t or ;:i. loan w:.:,,,; Lo 1)c used to refo.rm China I c curren,·y eye tcm in

;:i.nd J·u.pan.

Altl10uc;h China des:i..red to conclude -with Amcrj_cans only

the final ac;reement for a loan and expected them to issue the ma 0ior
bonds, the A�erican government made it clear that the proposed
currency reform would be of fundamental importance to all the powers
which had ex�ensive commercial relations with China as well as to
China itself.

The government of the United States requested the cor

dial support of the interested powers. 7 1 The American government

urged China to accept participation of the capitalists of other in
teres�ed powers in the proposed loan for currency reform.

And the

State Department pointed out that China could not reach the ultimate
2

goal of tariff revision without the concurrence of the treaty powers; 7
therefore, the success of this reform would depend on a large measure
upon the sympathetic cooperation of these powers.

When the State Department notified France, Germany, and England
of the preliminary agreement, inviting the cordial support and col
laboration of European bankers to carry out the currency reform,
French and German bankers insisted on joint signature of the final
loan agreement with China by all four groups; _American, British, French,
arid German.

At a conference in London, November 8-10, 1910 a q_uadruple

agreement was thereupon signed, providing for joint action in ca:73 m,
lnus, at -;;his London meeting, the firs-:; E'o-�;__r
_inese l oans.
rying Cb.
Power Banking Consortium for China was formed with the .Anierican
71.l b.l d •' pp. 91-92 .

72--foid. ' p. 94.

73.,...,
., '
.LO.LG.,

n.
.1:

92 •

34
�roup's pled�e to secure China's consent for the participation
o:f' the British, French, and German interests.

On February 11, 1911,

the .American minis-;;er to Peking, William J. Calhoun, notified the
Department of State of the willingness of the Chinese government
to have the quadruple signatures, and a financial adviser; the adviser
to be an American if unanimous consent was given, otherwise to be of
74
neutral nationality, Dutch preferred.
On April 15, 1911, the
loan agreement for currency reform and industrial developTuent in
Manchuria was signed by the local representatives of the quadruple
banks on the one hand and Duke Tsai-tse, President of the Board of
F.inance, on th
__e o..."-her hand •75

The rate of interest for this loan

was to be five per-cent and the term of the loan to be forty-five
years.

76

After the signature of the loan agreement in April, both
Russia and Japan stated their views on the currency loan to China.
When Japan, not represented in the quadruple group but greatly
concerned with China affairs, presented an inquiry as to the
possibility of participation, Secretary Knox replied that while it
was a matter primarily for the banks to decide, in case Japan should
apply for participation on an equal footing with others not now
parties to the London agreement of April 15, the State Depar�ment
would be prepared to support such

&"1

application •

77

Fu:cthermore,

Knox invited both Russian and Japanese support for the loan.
74 Th
.,
- lQ

•J

75 Th ..:,
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As t:1e .;:-·ei'orm was one in which all the lead:;.nc; powers -,Jere alD;:e
i!1tcresced, the United States consistently l':1vo1·cd the •widest;
possible international participation both in the loan and in the
78
reforms.
However, Russia and Japan voiced protest against
article XVL of the currency reform contract.

In view of' their

protest, it is interesting to note article XVL: 19
should the Chinese government decide 00 invi0e foreign
capitalists to participate with Chinese interests in �..an
churian business contemplated under this loan, or to be
undertaken in connection therewith, the banks shall first
be invited to so participate.
Article XVL granted to the signatory banks an option upon
future foreign loans relating to the same matters.

By this article

the Japanese government felt that the four powers' financial grot,p
in three Manchurian provinces was accorded pr-iority over other- foreigners
not only as regards enterprises contemplated by the agreement but in
the matter of' any other activities which might thereafter be associated
with such enterprises.

Japan pointed out that it had special inter-

ests and rights in southern lf,anchuria and therefore could not accept
measures that tended to menace those special rights and interests
and place Japanese subjects and institutions in a disadvantageious
position in comparison with other countries' subjects and institutions.
Japan insisted that difficulties of' the situation could be met satisfactorily either oy the entire suppression of' Article XVL or ·oy a
revision of that article to deprive oank concessionaires of the
80
preference.
Russia ex:pressed views similar to those of Japan.
18roid., pp.

9 6-9 8.

79westel W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights a11d Interests in Cl:.ira
Baltimore: 'The John Hopkins Press, 1920), p. 497.
U.S. Foreign Relations 1912, pp. 99-100.

·while ·ootr1 Russia and Japan put pres;:;ure on the quad:cu1)le powers,
'che c:u:::TE;nc:y refonri loan was in fact never floated because oi' the
outbreak of the Chinese revolution on October 10, 1911.

81

This

finally brought about the overthrow of the Vianchu Dynasty and the
establishment of the Chinese Republic.
After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912,
the Chinese government was confronted with almost insuperable difficulties.

Its treasury was empty, and its resources were drained.

Many government liabilities were awaiting liquidation before an ad
ministrative machinery could be put in full motion.

In order to

save this situation the new government had to resort to foreign loans.
In the middle of February, the Chinese acting minister of finance,
Chou Tzu-chi, approached the representatives of the Four-Power Con
sortium for advances to meet the monthly needs of the government.
Some days later, Tang Shao-Yi, who had arrived at Peking to arrange
a coalition government on behalf of the Republican authorities at
Nan.king, discussed with representatives of the Four-Power Consortium
the question of the immediate loan proposed by Chou Tzu-chi and,
in addition, suggested a large loan to reorga..�ize the Chinese admin

istration.82

In response to the Chinese request, the consortium ad

vanced to the Peking government 2,000,000 taels on February 28, and
1,100,000 taels on March 9.
At this juncture, it is necessary to note that whereas tne
currency reform and industrial development loan was intended largely

p. 1,.94.
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to bolster up a collapsin6 government by a reform proc;:c·am of the

Chinese cur:cency syste,n. and general econorrj_c promotion in the Ma:.'l.
churia,� ?rovinces, the purposes of the Reorganization Loan were 0he
support of the more conservative Yuan Faction contending for the
control of Republican China after the empire had been overthrown.

The negotiations over the Reorganization Loan were so intimately
con..Dected with the political developments of the new republic that
they can be unde:cstood only in the context of Chinese domestic
activities.

It is essential, therefore, to preface a consideration

of the Reorganization Loan negotiations with a brief survey of the
:cevo 1uvionary even�s. 83
.L .

•

The gene:cal terms of the Reorganization Loan were intended to
achieve two purposes.

The first was to enable the Chinese governmen-s

to reorganize its administration on an effective modern basis, to pay
off its large outstanding debts, and to build up Chinese credit.

The

second was to protect the interests of .American and European investors.
For such protection, in the judgment of the foreign governments and
the groups, the only method was to insure, despite any possible reoc
curence of political unrest in China, the proper expenditure of the
funds loaned to China and to safeguard the haDdling of the reven,1es
84
pledged for the principal and interest on the bonds.
In a letter, dated March 9, 1912, to the represen0atives
of the consor0ium, Yuan Shih-l'c' ai, President of t:O.e ?e�d:_-;_g ad:::L�:'...st::cation, confirmed the terms offered for the two advances and proposed
g:i
..)Fifie�d, .American Participation in the Chi:'.la Cocc.so:..'t:'...·L·.r:-.s, :p.
81,.
nThe Passing of Dollar Diplomacy, 11 American Jot:.r::-,al of
International Law, pp. 340-341.

l.hu.t L,hc Chlnc::;c :·:ovcrrnn(:mt ac::;urc the i';rrn:p,_; the l'irm OJJ1�ion
u:J.' unuc.rtakin� th..: corrrprehensive loan for L�cneral .reor1:;u.n.i.:c'.utlon
l)u..rposes alr eady p:coposed to them, to be floated as soon as possi.ole,
and to be applied in the first instance to the redemption of the
sterling treasury bills, aforesaid. But, only five days after he
had made this pledge, Yuan, under the pressure of immediate needs,
concluded an agreement with a 3elgian syndicate for a loan of-J_l,OOO,
000 designed to consolidate the central and local governments and
relieve the distresses prevailing among the people and in the com

mercial circles.85

The American, French, German, and British ministers

at Peking on March 25 protested that Belgian loan to Yuan Shih-k t ai
on the ground that the Chinese agreement with Belgian bank for a loan
was a breach of the contract or arrangemem:; made between Yuan Shih-k. 1 ai
an.d the representatives of the g;roups, evidenced by the exchange
of letters between him, and them dated March 9.

To this protest,

Yuan Shih-k'ai replied that China's need for money was very great, the
amount required was very large, and no doubt, Premier Tang Shao-yi
feared the ban_�ers would not be willing to give him all that was
required.

ful opportunity to secure more money from other sources

having presented itself, continued Yuan Shih-k 1 ai, he took advantage of
86
it and made the Belgian loan.
However, on April 27, 1912 a Chinese
govern�ent undertook to cancel the provisions of the 3elgian contrac�
relating to a loan off.10,000,000 and engaged not �o repay �he Be:gian
85Tiem-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson t s China Policy, 1913-1917
pp. 27-28.
86
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advances with funds borrowed from the four groups.

'rwo days later

i:,hc oankers were ins"cructed to resume nec;c\�iations with 1.;he Chinese
government.

o,

In view of the urgent need on the part of the Chinese govern
ment for funds and the fear of another loan being completed with an
independent banking group, and on conditions contained in the letter
of March 9, specifically to exclude all further outside borrowings,
the bankers were willing to make an immediate advance.

On lf.!ay 17,

consequently, 3,000,000 taels were turned over to the Chinese govern
ment.

The consortium made two more advances, one on June 12 for

3,000,000 taels and the other on June 18 for the same amount.

88

At the same time the four bari..king groups were enlarged into
a Six-Power Consortium through the entrance of Russia and Japan.
And these six foreign banks or groups of banks, acting for them
selves and for syndicated financial interesi:,s in their respective
countries, agreed that they would participate equally and upon
equal terms with regard to the proposed Reorganization Loan or any
other future administrative loans or advances which might be made
to the Chinese government to any of its provinces, or to companies
having Chinese government or privincial guarantees.

There was a

proviso that this should not be construed to include current bankin2:
business and small financial operations, ncr

loans thai:, did not

involve the issuance to public or bonds or cxther securities.

87

Tbid., :9. 124.
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or more of the p.::.rties decline to participate in a proposed loan,
the other par�ies would be free to undertake the loan, but the
bonds should be issued only in their respective markets.89

Both

Russia and Japan made reser�ations in entering the international
banking consortium.

The reservations pointed out that it was con

trary to the interests of Japan or of Russia to conclude a loan or
made any advance without approval by the Japanese group or the Rus
sian group, and that the Japanese or Russian group should be entitled
to withdraw from the agreement if such loan or advance were made
against its wishes.

The retiring group was �o remain bound by all

engagements into which it might have entered prior to such withd�awal.
The withdrawal of the Japanese group or the Russian group should not
90
affect the rights or liabilities of the other groups.
During the negotiations of the Reorganization Loan, it was
discovered that the powers concerned aimed at securing the super
vision of China 1 s finance.

The powers also demanded foreign admin

istration of the revenues pledged as security, the superv�sion of
the expenditure of funds, the specification of the purpose and
uses of

the advances, and the abstention of the Chinese govern

ment from making loans with other parties pending the issuance of
the Reorganization Loan.

To these proposals, the Chinese governmen0

refused to give its consent, objecting par0icularly to the foreign
superyision over expendi�ures and the disbandment of troops.

pp.

89w. W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests
499-50
90u.s. Foreign Relations, 1912, pp. 140-41.
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91

During -che; period of impasse the Cr1inese r;overnment, whid1
was then in urgent need of financial support from abroad, again 1;urned
to other sources from temporary relief.

This time it concluded, on

August 30, 1912, with an independent British syndicate, G. Birch
and Company, a loan of t:10,000,000 with the condition that G. Birch
and Company would be given preference should China seek to contract
future loans, provided the terms were equally advantageous as t;hose
otherwise obtainable.

The conclusion of this loan, commonly called

the Crisp Loan, called forth a second protest from the powers.

Ln.

consequence, the privilege of preference was withdrqwn and the issue
of the second half of the loan was cancelled at a compensation of
92
�150,000.
Thereafter, negotiations with the powers were resumed again.
They continued on during the winter of 1912-1913.
difficulties complicated the taL�s.

However, additional

France demanded repayment from

the Reorganization Loan funds of damages suffered by its nationals
during the looting and pillaging that accompanied the outbreak of
the revolution.

The Russians insisted upon a varied issue price

of the loan bonds, &"l.d the powers became involved in an exhausting
argument over the choice of auditors and financial supervisors who
93
France also insisted that;
were t o oversee the -1_oan expend i·t ure.
Frenc':J. advisers be named and that t!le nationali-cy of -che appointees
9lMingchien Joshua Bau, The
en Door Doctrine in Relation
to China (New Yo:'.'.'k: The Macmillan Co., 1923 , p. 79.

92Toid., pp. 79-80.
-93
Charles Venier, ':::'he Uni-ced Stat;es and China 1906-1913,
pp. 203-4,

should be p:coport::..or..s:te in number to the issue of bonas made in the
respec-cive countries.

Russia supported France.

In view of the lack

of agreement among the consortj_um powers the Chinese minister or
Finance sent a note to the consortium powers, saying that he would
break off the negotiations and borrow elsewhere. The British and
German ministers at Peking thereupon both said their interests in
China were too grea-c to be jeopardized either by the loan going to
pieces, or by the intrusion of other financial elements and notified
the Chinese that the British and German bankers were prepared to
accept the contract as it then stood, independently of the other
4
powers •9
In spite of the French position and the British and German
threat, the negotiations did not break down.

In the face of the

probable collapse of the consortium, the Chinese government adopted
a policy of reconciliation, notifying the six powers of the following
appointments: a Dane for the chief salt inspector; a German for
director of the foreign loan bureau; and an Italian for the adviser
tment.95
to aud i·t depar

The United States agreed to these appoint-

ments but suggested as an alternative that a representative of
France and of England be substituted for the Dane and Italian.
France and England naturally accepted American suggestion. 5:owevey,
Russia objected on the g-.cound that Russia..ri goverr..ment had t-ie larsest
proportion of the Boxer indemnity secured on the salt revenue and
96
therefore was entitled to representa-cion in its adminis-cration.

94U.S. Foreign Relations, 1913, p. 147.
95_
Ib _
_., p. 151.
i.d

96

I'oid., p. 151.

was to ,Je of Cerm.u.n mu,ionalityj the c:hief :..;ult ln:..;pccLor, Brit.,i1:.:hj
and of the two associated directors of the audit and accounts depart
ment one was to be French and the other Russian.

This proposal was

not approved by the United States:'7 Negotiations over the appointment of foreign advisers among the powers at Peking were thus at
In view of the confusion, the United States ur(!;ed

a standstill.

that the negotiations proceed but avoid questions of a purely politi�al
consideration, and suggested as a compromise solution the appointment of a Dane as chief salt inspector, a German as director of the
national loan bureau, and a Frenchman as director of the audit depart
ment.

The United States also pointed out that it preferred to have

the appointments made on a basis of efficiency rather than nationality. 98
The United States found no support except from the German government
for its compromise proposal relating to foreign advisers connected
with the reorganization loan.

France insisted that four advisers

be appointed instead of three, and Russia demanded that one Russian
adviser be appointed.

The Russian government argued that control

over the finances of China should be entrusted to foreign advisers
chosen by the powers, not by the Chinese government.

99 In support

of its demand, the Russian government recalled the Russo-Chinese
declaration, signed in St. Petersburg in 1895, which stated tbat Cl1ina
would not i::west any country with rigrrcs of supervision OYer

&"ly

'Jranch of her revenue without extending the same righ':s -co Russia.

.
97�
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--c,o China.

�he French were cooperating wi-ch Russia and together -chey

forced England �n�o line.

�he United States minister at Peking,

William J. Calhoun clearly pointed out the s:i.tuation when he report101
ed to the Secretary of State on February 21, 1913:
The outlook was such that there could be no hope of early
signature. To my mind it was no longer a question of
friendly international cooperation to help China but a
combination of big powers with common interests to accomplish
their own selfish political aims.

101� .

1-Dl d ., p.
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VI.

N1ERICAl"'\J vlITHDRAWJ\.L FROM 'I1H3 C0NS0RTTIJM

While dLsa:_r.r.eement continued, it seemed impossible to
reach an accord with the Reorganization Loan agreement.
political scene was changing in the United States.

The domestic

In November, 1912,

tr-.e ?rogressive ferment split the Republican party and brought the
Democrats to control in Washington with the election of Woodrow
Wilson as Presiden-c.

This turn of events forced the .kr!erican group

to reconsider its position.
The American group originally had entered the Chinese loan
negotiations at the request of the Department of State and had acted
continuously with the Department's approval and direction.

The

Republican administration of Presiden Taft had given the official
invitation to the American group to enter Chinese loan scramble.
Because of their critism of big business during the campaign,
heavily on their anti-big crusade, the Democrats did not appear like102
ly to favor the continuance of the bankers 1 operations in China.
Owing to the political situation in America as well as the
uncer-cain financial conditions in China, the A.rnerican group seriously
contemplated withdrawal from the negotiations for a loan unless the
103
U:90:1 learning of the
contract was signed wit:1ou-;:; :::\rrther delay.
intention of the bankers to withdraw, Secretary Knox le-c it be known
that a'J..y scJ.dden change of attitude on the part of -cae American group
would end in embarrassment to the government, and 1-,_rged -che Ar:ierica..'1
102

cha!·les Venier, ':'he U.S. and Chi,1a, 1906-1913, p. 204.
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�6
ban'r<:ers not

de-::ide upon any cimnge 'J.ntil the ne:ict admin:i.st.ration
102,
nad declared its �)ol::..cy ce::;ardinc; the matter.
'i:his was the
00

situation when President Woodrow Wilson as;:;urned office on March L:-,
1913.
Under the working of the AJnerican political system, all
national policies, including foreign policy, are dependent upon the
views of the administration in power.

The �embers of the Arierica._�

group very naturally desired to know whether -che new adrd.n::..st.ration
would continue to regard them as an indespensaole instrument.ality of
governmental policy in the Far East or whether they would be rele6ated
to the non-preferred position of ordinary private citizens holding
10
a contract tiwh a foreign government. 5

On March 5, 1913, the American group requested Secre-cary of
State William J. Bryan, to let them know his wishes as to the future
conduct of the negotiations.

106

A decision was requested from the

State Department concerning its policy toward the international
banking consortium.

The members of the group took a perfectly clear

position that. they would not continue their efforts u..11_less the v;-ilson
administration renewed the request of the previous administ.rat.ion.
Secretary Bryan was not prepared -co give an immediate answer,
107
but he replied that he would take action in due course.
On March
104
Tiem-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson 1 s China Policy, 1913-1917, P•

105

c-eorge A. Finch 11American Diplomacy and the ?inancing of
China, 11 American Journal or In-cernat-::..onal Law, WI (New Hampsr:ire, the
Rumford Press, 1922), p. 30.
106U • S • n
.
Re_auions,
7 ��oreigc
1913, p. 168.
107
'i:hor:.as �,!. Laeont, rienry P. Davison: T".le Record of a liseful
Life (New Yorl-:: Harpers, 1933), p. 162.

!1 '(

13, 1913, I)i�esident Wilson issued to tl1e l)ress n declaratj_on of tl1i2

policy of the United States with regard to China.

'i:he statement

marked a radical change in American foreign policy and occupied a
sigr..ificant page in United States-Chinese relations.

President Wilson's

statement was as follows:
The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly
the administrative independence of China itself, and this
administration does not feel that it ought, even by impli
cation, t-o be a party to those conditions. The responsibility
on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers
to undertake theloan might conceivably go to the length
in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the
financial, and even the political, affairs of that great
oriental stat-e, just now awakening to a consciousness of its
power and of its obligations to its people. The conditions
include not only the pledging of particular taxes, some of
them antiq_uated and brudensome, to secure the loan, but
also the administration of those taxes by foreign ager..ts.
The responsibility on the part our government implied in the
encouragement of a loan thus secured and administered is
plain enough and is obnixious to the principles upon which
the government of our people rests.
The government of the United States is not only willing,
but earnestly desirous, of aiding the great Chinese people in
every way that is consistent with their untrammeled develop
ment and its own immemorial principles ••• The American people
certainly wish to participate in the opening to the Chinese
and to the use of the world the almost untouched and perhaps
unrivaled resources of China.
The government of the United States is earnestly desirous
of promoting the most extended and intimate trade relatior..ship
between this country and the Chinese Republic. The present
administration will urge and support the legislative measures
necessary to give American merchants, manufacturers, contractors,
and enginners the banking and other financial facilities which
they are at a serious disadvantage as compared with t-heir
industrial and corrm1ercial rivals. T:1.is is its duty. This :'..s ".:;:i.e
main material interest of its citizens in t-�e developmen-c o�
China. Our interests are those of t�e open doo�--a door o�
friendship and m tual advantage. This is the only c.oor we
care to e;ter.10 g
President Wilson I s statement was immediately corr,mu.nica-ced -co
the interest-ed governmen-cs and the American ;roup promptly a..v:nounced
its withdrawal from the loan.
lOB--c.s. Fo�eign Relations,
1913, pp. l;C-171.

'rhe withdrawal of' the United States left China without a
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disinterested friend to help her in her deG.line;s with other powers.
Af'ter the loss of' the United States there was no moral leader among
the powers which would uphold the doctrine of eg_ual opportunity of
As a consequence, the Powers reverted
109
to their old practices of international struggle for concessions.

trade and integrity of China.

With the .American group's withdrawal from Chinese loans, the
United States, for a short time at least, ended its efforts in China.

109
M.

u.

Bau, The Open Door Doctrine in Relation to China, p. 84.

\.'l��.

Lnitc� �tatcs toward China

was based upon tie principles of tne Open

0oor policy--equali ty of corm:-,ercial o?:JOrtuni ty and the ::,aintenance
of t::1C territorial and adi:1inistrative inte?rity and political incle-

i:-:i:)Ort2nce.

In con-crast, :)Otn Presicte:1t 'Taft anc Secretary of. Stat.::

Knox were ;-,rouu to call t:�eir -;:>olicy "dollar diplo::1acy".
aC:ninistration stressed

11

colL2rs not oullets

11

The ';o.ft

as t�,e 1:iovin:; force

of its foreign policy.
Taft was convinced cf t:.c ?rime iuportance in ;::overr.r:8nt
?Olicy ::if promoting tae ir,dustrial m.,d cor:1r.1ercic:..l ?ros::,erity of tl'-.e
countr:,.·.

"-e r,aturally regarced. the exnansion of foreign cor:i.:;;erce

as a basic rcc;uirer::enc :or tlic nation's econo::1ic ;iror.;ress am... conceiveo it to '..le: t�v� rcs:;:-ionsL)ility of :;overn:-:-ent to :�ro�,10t::: sue;,
ex�ansion.

It was in this contexc that the T�ft a��inistrat:an

of c-:ci,ili -:.:, of o:,;)ortt:n::. ty an0. rt:!s:;ect fer ti.e. C:incsc terr::. tori al

cx;:ar:.sior...

so

virtua2.l:• cori?l<2.tcci.

,·merican investors, I,:10 :,ad :ound in earlier

years .:1buncant or;)Ortuni ties for profitable inves tnent -3.t home,
were jcconin� □ore interested in possibilities of foreign invest-

ican �ooC:s anc

.'.l

plo.ce for investia3 .\ncrican capital.

Because o:'.:

L1e µoliticc:l and econonic wealrness of China, t'.1c L;r,ited States
considered her national interest as bound U? with t:1at nation's
territorial and ac::iiniscrative integrity, wrlic.:1 was threatened ":ly
Ei.;ro?ean ?Owers.

The ...;.�i tee.. States sought to ;,revent the part:ition

of China anc.. also to ?revent the acquisition by any single power,
es:,ecially Ja)an or :-:.ussia, of exclusive interests anci rights in
C.1ina.

Bot/, Taft and Knox ;1o?e<l ti1at Ci:tina 1:d;;ht oe sta·::iilizec ?O-

litically and 2conor.1ically, and tr,ey Delieved. tnat t;1is coulc. l>e
pror..oted taroug;1 tne loans and ca!_)ital invest'.i1ents by /u:,eric'-'n financial interests an<l by urr,ing Chinese reform.

1::1.is oelie:': in the

comr>ati'.)ility of nelping A:::ierican tiusiness and strengnfoeninr; Ciiina
a:.;ainst encro&cr.r:-,cnt led t:1.e Taft a<lcinistration to a ?OSitive a?;:>r0.J.c .. ar,c.. cor;;;:.i tr..ent tc dollar c.ipior.�acy.

::.1..is • Taft anc. �-:nox

in r:ii.lroa(_:, rcorzGni zatio1�, and currency

::o
... ·,4

'"\

\,..i.l.�.

£er

o��os2 Lxclusiv� ri
cipl� of t�e U�en joor.

51

lc;,m:;, to

.,:i-i..nt.:::i:� t'.1e -:ir in-

�3ft himself ha� an intense )Crsonal interest

in :::al�in� use of Ancrican capital in t:,e C::evelo-;:,r.1cnt of China .:i.n
instru;:-.ent fo::- t;ie ?rorwtior. of the welfare of t�1at country.

i{e

ent :)oli::ics.l ?Oucr 2.r.� c:1c nreservation of ·�.er territorial inte�rity.

llO

rdilro.::ics, fro·:, :1l.:1cin<; its currenc7 on :: souncl :i.::sis, .:2nc fro,"\ reorsanizin� its �overnr:1cnt.

rurthcrnore, ':'aft and iZnox :;resunaDl:'

rc;clraeci it as beneficial to China to �ave such loans aade by internatior,al ::;rou.,s rather than by any one po0.,,,er, which r:,ight utilize
suc:1 loans as a tool of ir.1::ierialisr:1.

Thus collar diplor.:acy was de-

signed to �clp both China and t�e Unite� St�tes.
Tnousi. t"r1e air..s of the 7aft .:md :znox ".)Olicy in C:1ina 2.ffairs
may ·oe praiseworthy,

e,e

rJethods of their C:iplomacy \lere neither

practical, realistic, nor successful.

The fundamental weakness

of the Taft-1(nox ::,olicy in China was ti1at jot;, men ignorea or fal.led
to reco(;nizc t.,e irresponsi'Jle anC: sclfis;:-, :.,otives of t:,e :10_.;·crs ir.-

,,. .. c. •• Sec rt. t.:.ry .�nox cal lee: for COO?..;ration ar.:on� t·he interest2...: ')Owers for t .•e cor:-.ncrcial, financial, au: railroa.:.. nc1...cralization,
.:. co:1r,:,l,-x scr:.cs of reactio:-i .. rcsulteci.

-----

llJ� . ..> .

2., 19�J,

j;:.:;_)an anC: ?.ussia were uni;:ed

..

.
�.i .. t,;..

Wni t2c.

/.ussia anc. JJ.pL�. in :,anchuria, the Taft-.Zno:x policy incurrc0 tne ill
will o� l.ussia .:md irritated Japan.

T'.1e fr.ilure of t:1e policy of the

Taft adr,1iaistration in ;-ianchuri:1 was due to the inability to obtain

o:1rosit1.on of

,uss1.a anc: Japan.

Ja;:iar, was c..cc:)ly interestec. .i.;-, C:1i:1.:.:

and ai�ed at tnc est�jlis��ent of �esc�ony over t�ar cohntry.

Jollar

cii?lo::::::cy ·.•1&.s cle2rl:,, u. :.:en ace to t'.:1c )ri vi :.c...,.cC. ,csi ticn of Jap,ir. .....

ri�e u.n� i;ncre the aisconteGt of the Cnite� States.

:?t.:rtnen:,orc •

t�e Cnite� Staces never supplied any �ilitary SU??Crt for the Open
Joor policy in C1ina.
?�rase.

T�e Open Door u.::;.s harcily �ore than a beautiful

In substar.ce, the 'l'.::;.ft-Knox :?ar i.:aster:1 policy ·•.ras

.:t

forced

ar.d unl,a??Y r:.arrL,(:e .Jet;1een ic.icalis::1 and co,:-.r.:ercialiscr:.
,.-.rea:�ncs:; of t�,2 ;iolicy w�s t;:e failure of the St.:ice Je_r;cJ.rtr:.c·:-it to
acr;_uire accur�tc inforr::at:;.on o,. Asiatic-r:uro:,can .::.ffai-r:;.

t�.. c virtue of Joll.::r

�ro� n� i�calistic
.

J..3Y 1n

1

ics

r: •.
..,_

�:::. � lvr·,o.c:r.

,c ,..!
.. - ,._ � _ .,_n�· .-c:: ee l_,...,:_ �,:;

,:-;r:�J �i�

·c::.

ex:;lcit:ition.

It 1:,i�l1t have been ,ossible fpr dollar di-,lo:1acy

:-:;e::-.ts of t·.,c r1.1ti0:-,s.

to :,::-ovice o. s t:ron� founccition for better "!'."C L:itions acong different
couhtrics if it :1ac been based s�uarely on �oral considerations.

.

,

!n

'

:.ntene;c.�c to serve t:1e :Je:st i�tcrests of Jeth

uclferc of C�i�a ��s the �a�or consiccration.
·,:hatcve:: the true r::otives of Taft c:,nc .�nox v10re, t:-1eir :1olicy
.:iccor:? lishec little to ?rE:vent the forei3n ex;,loi tation of Chin.:1.
acccr::?lis:.1ec: little even fror: a selfis:-i standuoin.::
ican investors.

It

t:1at is, for .\:.1er-

It :,ad tnc effect of s'.1arr,enini conflict ar::on[!; t:1e

raajor states ins-c::eac of iDproving international relaticn3.

A�out

the r.1ost that can be said for it is that it nay :-iave '.)een well-intentioned.

?ublic
�.s.

�e?art�ent of State.
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